DOES THE UNIVERSE REQUIRE A CAUSE? AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST PREMISE IN THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.
In the article "Why Should I Believe God Exists in the First Place?" I discussed an argument called the Kalam Cosmological Argument. If you have not read that article, I encourage you to do so before reading any further. I will not be repeating much from that article here, so it may be easier to follow the argument below if you have first read the background for it.
In the previous article, I described the Kalam Cosmological Argument as follows:
(1) Anything that comes into existence has a cause.
(2) The universe came into existence.
Therefore,
(3) The universe has a cause.
In an effort not to get too sidetracked from the main point of that article, I only touched very briefly on premise (1), and instead focused more on some atheistic responses that have tried to come up with some "natural" explanation for the cause of the universe (such as inflation theory).
However, in fairness, there have been a small number of philosophers who have actually tried to attack premise (1) of this argument. The extent of my response to these philosophers in the original article was as follows:
In our experience, nothing spontaneously comes into existence. Think about it. Can you provide even one example in which something goes from a state of non-existence into a state of existence without some agency initiating the change? Left to their own devices, objects in nature tend to maintain the status quo. In order for change to come about, something has to initiate that change. For example, a peanut butter and jelly sandwich will never make itself. In order to change from slices of bread, peanut butter, and jelly, into one unified sandwich, a causal entity (i.e., a person) must be involved. If the universe similarly came into existence at some point in the past (as Big Bang theory requires), then something must have caused it to exist.
Now some skeptics may argue that we cannot "know" that a cause is required for the universe even if it did come into existence at some point in the past. After all, we have no affirmative evidence of such a cause. In fact, I am assuming the existence of a cause in order to argue for what I believe is the source of that cause (i.e., God). To a certain extent, this objection would be correct. We cannot know with 100% certainty that the creation of the universe required a cause. But this objection misses the point.
We are not trying to prove the existence of God to 100% certainty. For reasons I explain in the next article, requiring 100% certainty of God's existence would be setting up a double standard between knowledge of God and every other kind of knowledge we claim about our existence. What we are exploring here is what is the best explanation for the phenomenon of our universe based upon the evidence that is currently available. Can you provide me with even one single example of something going from a state of non-existence to a state of existence without some causal entity initiating the change? If not, you must concede that based on our currently available evidence and understanding, the best explanation for the creation of the universe is that some causal entity was involved.
I now want to touch on the objections to premise (1) in a bit more detail.
Wes Morriston from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, raises a number of objections to premise (1).1
(1) Even if we assume that everything that comes into existence within time requires a cause, this does not mean that something that comes into existence at the beginning of time requires a cause.
(2) The notion of an uncaused entity is no more illogical than the notion of something being created out of nothing, which is also a necessary belief for theistic creation.
Morriston raises some other objections as well (such as the claim that premise (1) is not intuitively obvious), but none of them are particularly on point to the argument I made in my first article, so I do not address them here. I will address these two objections one at a time.
The first objection basically admits that in every example we can cite, things that come into existence appear to require a cause. However, all of these examples occur within time. The universe, though, came into being simultaneously with time (i.e., time began at the same point as the rest of the universe). So there is no reason to believe that the same rules of causation we see in our temporal universe would also exist at the beginning of time.
The obvious initial response to this argument is to point out that Morriston also has no reason to believe that the rules of causation should NOT exist at the beginning of time. Why should I reject the data I receive from every single other facet of existence based solely upon one factor that may or may not be relevant? The mere fact that there is a difference does not mean that it is a RELEVANT difference. Allow me to illustrate. Assume we have two objects within our temporal universe. One is red and the other is blue. Both come into existence. I know that the red object required a cause for its existence. Should I then conclude that the blue object did not require a cause simply because it is blue? Of course not. There is a difference between the two objects. But until you illustrate to me that there is a RELEVANT difference, I am going to continue to operate under the assumptions that are justified by every other example in existence. You have not shown me why the fact that something is blue should mean that it does not require a cause. Similarly, Morriston has not demonstrated why the fact that something begins to exist at the beginning of time also should not need a cause.
Perhaps even more damaging to Morriston's argument is his concession that it is possible for a cause to be simultaneous with its effect. He states, "In our experience, causes always bear a temporal relation to their effects. They are either temporally prior to, or perhaps simultaneous with, their effects." So if a cause occurs simultaneous to its effect that would satisfy his requirement for a "temporal relation" between cause and effect.2
William Lane Craig responded to Morriston effectively.
Among them are the following:
What is the relevant difference between something's coming into existence within time and something's coming into existence at the beginning to time? If the universe could not come into existence uncaused at t, where t is preceded by earlier moments of time, why think that if we were to annihilate all moments earlier than t, then the universe could come into existence uncaused at t? How could the existence of moments earlier than an uncaused event be of any possible relevance to the occurrence of that event?3
In other words, if God caused the universe simultaneously with the creation of the universe itself, then both events occurred at time t. The fact that there were no points in time prior to t is irrelevant. The universe exists in time, not outside of it. Because it solely exists temporally, it requires a cause just like everything else that solely exists temporally.4
The second objection states that the notion of an uncaused entity is no more illogical than the notion of something being created out of nothing, which is also a necessary belief for theistic creation. In other words, the idea that everything that comes into existence requires a cause is intuitively obvious from everything we see around us. But equally obvious is the idea that something cannot be built without the raw materials to build it. In order to build a house, we need lumber, nails, drywall, etc. But the Christian notion of creation says that prior to the creation of the universe, there were no raw materials. Morriston argues that the Christian cannot in one breath argue that the necessity of a cause is intuitively obvious while at the same time claiming the counterintuitive notion of creation out of nothing.
Mr. Morriston is right in one respect. The concept of creation ex nihilo (i.e., creation out of nothing) is not intuitively obvious. In fact, it runs contrary to everything we see around us every day. But here is where Morriston's argument falls apart. Creation ex nihilo is a fact, regardless of whether or not the universe required a cause.
Remember that time was not the only thing created at the Big Bang. So was matter. If matter began to exist at the Big Bang, that means that "before" the Big Bang, there was no matter. This is true whether you think there was some point in linear time prior to the Big Bang or not. Either way, matter began to exist at the Big Bang. So there was no raw material from which to build the universe. Logically speaking, since there were no raw materials, nothing should exist. After all, as Morriston stated, when we look at everything in existence around us, the creation of something always requires raw materials to build it. Since there were no raw materials, nothing should have been capable of being built. But here's the problem. We DO exist. We cannot deny that despite the lack of raw materials, matter does exist. So whether you think the Big Bang was caused or uncaused, the end result was the same. Matter came into being from the lack of matter.
So we have two possibilities: (1) the universe was caused, or (2) the universe was uncaused. The first possibility is counterintuitive in the sense that it involves the creation of matter from no matter. The second suffers from this same counter-intuition. But in addition it is also counterintuitive on another ground, namely that it assumes something coming into being without a cause. So whereas a caused creation is counterintuitive on one ground, an uncaused creation is counterintuitive on two. Not only that, but the one counterintuitive ground that the two theories share is undeniably true, whether we think it is logical or not. The only possible conclusion is that matter did indeed come from no matter, even if we do not yet understand how this occurred.
In closing, I feel I should point out one more problem with the atheistic position on creation. As is the case in various atheistic arguments, in order to "hold their ground" in one arena they are forced to contradict themselves in another. Anthony Flew, probably the leading atheistic philosopher of the late 20th century (Mr. Flew now concedes the existence of God) used to often say that despite the evidence of Christ's resurrection, he could not accept it because in his worldview miracles were not possible. Therefore, even if we could not see it, there must be some other explanation for the evidence of Christ's resurrection.
Flew has explicitly stated in relation to the resurrection evidence that he does not believe it is possible for anyone to offer a "full, naturalistic explanation of what was going on there." He also said, "Perhaps one has to raise, in considering any alleged miracle, that what is rational for you to hold depends on the nature of your prior beliefs. For a person like myself, confronted with an apparent miracle, the rational thing is to think that there must be some mistake here."5
So in order to deny the evidence for the resurrection, we need to start with an assumption that miracles are not possible. Then we set a much higher standard for proof of any alleged miracle than we would set for anything else. But when Morriston is defending the idea of an uncaused universe, he states, "Like most philosophers since Hume, I have no trouble conceiving a world in which things occasionally pop into existence without a cause." So even though everything we know about the universe says this is not possible, in order to deny God atheists claim that it is possible. Of course, something "popping" into existence without a cause would be nothing short of a miracle. Just ask yourself, how would you feel if you were walking down the street one day and an apple just magically appeared in the air right in front of your face? You would undeniably consider this to be miraculous.
So in order to deny God's role in the creation the atheist has to acknowledge that miracles are possible. But in order to deny the evidence of Christ's resurrection they have to claim that miracles are not possible! When they are forced into a corner in one arena, they "hold their ground" by making a claim without recognizing that the claim contradicts the atheistic argument in another arena. In short, the atheist camp repeatedly fails to put forward a coherent and consistent position against Christianity without contradicting themselves.
So in the end, we are left with the conclusion that the universe requires a cause, and it appears that it was caused at the same point in linear time as when it came into existence. In order to deny this fact, the atheistic camp not only contradicts the evidence from every other realm of reality, but also contradicts it's own argument against Christ's resurrection. Faced with the impossibility of advancing a consistent atheistic position, we are left with the overwhelming probability of the existence of a causal entity for the universe. The "Argument for Christianity" explains in great detail how we can know that this causal entity is the Christian God.
Footnotes
1 Morriston, Wes, "Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? A Critical Examination of the kalam Cosmological Argument" Faith and Philosophy Vol. 17, No. 2 (2000), 149-169.
2 Allow me to present you with an example of an effect simultaneous to its cause. Consider the effect of the color yellow changing into the color green. Most of us probably remember the old Ziploc commercial that said "Yellow and blue make green!" Well, the very instant blue is added to yellow, it becomes green. The effect is changing yellow to green. The cause is adding blue. But the effect occurs at the precise same moment as the cause.
3 Craig, William Lane, "Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?: A Rejoinder", http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/morriston.html (2005).
4 Note that I do not quite agree with Mr. Craig's conclusion of how God interacts with His creation. He states that before the creation of the universe, God existed atemporally, but after the creation He entered into the universe and exists temporally. In some of my articles I have argued that God continues to exist outside of time. This accounts for his omniscience. Because He exists outside time, all times are equally accessible to Him. He does not see the "future". Rather, all times are "right there in front of Him", so He simply sees what is apparent "right in front of His eyes." I see nothing that would say that a being that exists outside time is incapable of interacting with beings that live temporally. Because God does not exist temporally, He does not require a cause.
5 Habermas, Gary R. & Flew, Anthony G., Resurrected? An Atheist and Theist Dialogue. Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (2005).
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